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ABSTRACT 
Corporate governance in both financial and non-financial firms is an 
important issue by researchers. A large number of corporate scandals across the 
world are due to financial scandals, weaknesses and failures in corporate governance, 
as well as risk taking that could attribute to poor financial performance. This study 
focused on the effects of corporate governance characteristics (board independence, 
board size, independent risk management committee, risk management committee 
size, independent audit committee, audit committee size and ownership 
concentration) on financial performance and risk taking. The study also assessed the 
role of risk taking as mediator on relationship among corporate governance and 
financial performance, besides comparing the financial performance of Islamic and 
conventional banks. This study was based on data collected from 37 published 
annual reports of Malaysian banks (21 conventional and 16 Islamic banks) for the 
period between 2005 to 2014. Data were analyzed using ordinary least square, fixed 
effect, generalized method of moments, approach of Baron and Kenny, Sobel test 
and independent t-test. The results stated that financial performance is positively 
related to corporate governance characteristics and there is a significant relationship 
between corporate governance and risk taking. On the other hand, risk taking plays 
the role of mediator between four characteristics of corporate governance (board 
independence, independent risk management committee, independent audit 
committee and ownership concentration) and financial performance in all banks as 
well as conventional banking sectors. Result of the study also showed full mediation 
between board independence and financial performance while partial mediation 
between independent risk management committee, independent audit committee and 
ownership concentration with banks financial performance. In contrast, risk taking 
has not mediated the relationship between board size, risk management committee 
size and audit committee size with financial performance in all banks, conventional 
and Islamic banks. However, there were significant differences between the financial 
performance of Islamic and conventional banks. This study contributes to the 
continuing debate on corporate governance and financial performance by providing a 
timely investigation of banks corporate governance, financial performance and risk 
taking. This study highlights the importance of effective future public policy to 
understand which aspects of corporate governance have the greatest impact on 
financial performance after considering risk taking.   
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ABSTRAK 
Tadbir urus korporat di kedua-dua firma kewangan dan bukan kewangan 
merupakan satu isu penting bagi penyelidik. Sebilangan besar skandal korporat di 
seluruh dunia adalah disebabkan oleh skandal kewangan, kelemahan dan kegagalan 
dalam tadbir urus korporat dan juga pengambilan risiko yang boleh dikaitkan dengan 
prestasi kewangan yang lemah. Kajian ini memberi tumpuan kepada kesan ciri-ciri tadbir 
urus korporat (kebebasan lembaga, saiz lembaga, jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko yang 
bebas, saiz jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko, jawatankuasa audit bebas, saiz jawatankuasa 
audit dan penumpuan pemilikan) terhadap prestasi kewangan dan pengambilan risiko. 
Kajian ini juga menilai peranan pengambilan risiko sebagai pengantara antara tadbir urus 
korporat dan prestasi kewangan, selain membandingkan prestasi kewangan antara bank 
Islam dengan bank konvensional. Kajian ini adalah berdasarkan data yang dikumpul 
daripada 37 laporan tahunan yang diterbitkan oleh bank-bank di Malaysia (21 bank 
konvensional dan 16 bank Islam) untuk tempoh antara tahun 2005 hingga 2014. Data 
dianalisis dengan menggunakan kuasa dua terkecil biasa, kesan tetap, kaedah momen 
am, pendekatan Baron dan Kenny, ujian Sobel dan ujian-t bebas. Dapatan kajian 
menunjukkan bahawa prestasi kewangan mempunyai hubungan yang positif dengan ciri-
ciri tadbir urus korporat dan terdapat hubungan yang signifikan antara tadbir urus 
korporat dengan pengambilan risiko. Sebaliknya, pengambilan risiko memainkan 
peranan pengantara antara empat ciri-ciri tadbir urus korporat (kebebasan lembaga, 
jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko yang bebas, jawatankuasa audit bebas dan penumpuan 
pemilikan) dan prestasi kewangan di semua bank termasuk sektor perbankan 
konvensional. Keputusan kajian juga menunjukkan terdapat pengantaraan penuh antara 
kebebasan lembaga dan prestasi kewangan serta pengantaraan separa antara 
jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko yang bebas, jawatankuasa audit bebas dan penumpuan 
pemilikan dengan prestasi kewangan bank. Sebaliknya, pengambilan risiko tidak 
mempunyai hubungan sebagai pengantara antara saiz lembaga, saiz jawatankuasa 
pengurusan risiko dan saiz jawatankuasa audit dengan prestasi kewangan di semua bank, 
konvensional dan bank Islam. Walau bagaimanapun, terdapat perbezaan yang signifikan 
antara prestasi kewangan bank Islam dengan bank konvensional. Kajian ini 
menyumbang kepada perdebatan berterusan tentang tadbir urus korporat dan prestasi 
kewangan dengan melaksanakan kajian yang tepat pada masanya tentang tadbir urus 
korporat bank, prestasi kewangan dan pengambilan risiko. Kajian ini menekankan 
kepentingan dasar awam masa depan yang berkesan untuk memahami aspek tadbir urus 
korporat yang mana mempunyai impak yang besar ke atas prestasi kewangan selepas 
menimbangkan pengambilan risiko. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1    General Overview    
    In recent decades, performance of firms has been considered in many 
studies leading to the expansion of body of literature. Due to the significant 
contribution of performance measurement implemented in different corporate firms, 
assessment of firm performance has become extremely important. Furthermore, the 
difficulties that firms faced during the Asian and global financial crises also affected 
the performance of corporate firms. In fact, when a business is not capable of 
meeting its obligation commitment, it comes up with a poor performance. In this 
regard, assessment of business environment performance in firms has two major 
research streams. One line of research is based on non-financial performance, which 
is not expressed in monetary units, and includes measures of customer satisfaction 
and number of new products. The other stream of research is with regard to financial 
performance. Assessment of financial performance for the process of decision-
making and specifically its contribution to strategy implementation is vital for any 
type of financial organization such as banking industry.   
Since banking sector makes a significant contribution to countries’ economic 
growth, its performance measurement has become a key topic in management 
research on financial performance. Presence of both Islamic and conventional banks 
in competitive environment has highlighted the necessity of addressing their 
performance. The rapid growth of Islamic banking requires having a greater 
understanding of its practices and drivers. Indeed, given the international spread of 
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Islamic banking practices, a study comparing the performance of Islamic and 
conventional banking is of great  interest Iqbal (2001). The principles governing 
Islamic banks are significantly different from those of conventional banks. Islamic 
banks are organized under principles of Islamic law (shariah), and operate 
accordingly. This requires risk sharing and avoidance from the payment of interest 
(riba). In contrast, conventional banks are oriented mainly by the profit maximization 
principle (Olson and Zoubi, 2008). Banks performance can be assessed with the aim 
of looking at past and current trends, and determining future estimate. Achieving 
short and long-term obligations requires the consideration of factors that may affect 
performance.    
1.2    Background of the Study 
The emergence of financial crises across the world including the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis in 2007/2008 have been 
documented in the literature (Haat et al., 2008). The Asian crisis was attributed to 
inefficient and poor governance practices (Goldin and Vogel, 2010), while during 
global financial crisis in 2007/008, the stock price dropped and major banks entered 
into bankruptcy (Cheffins, 2009).  Moreover, it ignited a deep global recession with 
concerns about the solvency of many of the world’s largest financial firms, which led 
to catastrophic losses as a result of the mortgage crisis (Lang and Jagtiani, 2010). 
The global financial crisis has been the subject of a large number of theoretical and 
empirical studies that focus on two particular aspects; the sources and the 
consequences of the financial downturn (Asenova, 2011; Foster and Magdoff, 2009; 
Shiller, 2008; Vidal, 2010). These studies suggest that the subprime crisis, the 
Federal Reserve monetary policy in 2000, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and 
range of innovative financial products were at the root of the crisis.  
In addition, the last few decades have witnessed several economic downturns 
and a large number of corporate scandals across the world. Corporate governance is 
an important issue due to these financial scandals, and has been taken in to 
consideration by researchers as well as investors. Lack of management oversight and 
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weakness of corporate governance practices are the two major causes identified 
during investigation of scandals(Kirkpatrick, 2009b). Furthermore, entrusting 
unlimited authority to executives has also provided the ground for abuse. All those 
conditions led to scandals in big companies around the world, including well-known 
companies like; World Come Inc, Enron and Adelphia (Munzig, 2003). To avoid 
such situations, proper governance of stakeholders through regular monitoring and 
auditing of the executive management is required, which is a process known as 
corporate governance. 
Majority of the discussion in the area of corporate governance has focused on 
understanding the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
(Cadbury et al., 1992; Dunlop, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Prior research on 
the relationship between corporate governance and company performance mentioned 
that a stronger corporate governance is related to a higher company performance 
(Ammann et al., 2011; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Core et al., 2006; Cremers and Nair, 
2005; Gompers et al., 2003; Yermack, 1996). In addition, the role of corporate 
governance in the banking industry was examined in many studies which showed 
that effective corporate governance had positive effect on bank performance (Laeven 
and Levine, 2009; Macey and O'hara, 2003; Mishra and Nielsen, 2000; Sierra et al., 
2006). However, number of studies mentioned that banks corporate governance is 
different from nonfinancial firms, which is probably due to the banks having more 
stakeholders and complex business environment (Adams and Mehran, 2003; Andres 
and Vallelado, 2008; Bolton et al., 2011). Dedu and Chitan (2013) investigated the 
influence of internal corporate governance on bank performance and found a 
negative relationship between them. Moreover, many scholars recommended that 
better financial performance relates to good governance, and powerful procedures 
may constraint managerial opportunisms (Bebchuk et al., 2009; Cremers et al., 2005; 
Gompers et al., 2003). 
To get the desired outcome, business needs to be organized and well-
arranged. Lewis (2005) pointed out that the way firms are organized, directed and 
controlled, briefly called corporate governance, would be one aspect of a wider plan. 
Although the topic of corporate governance is addressed seriously by some 
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organizations such as Islamic development banks e.g. Chapra and Chapra (1992), 
Pomeranz (1997), Ahmad (2000), AAOIFI (2003), the research world lacks 
empirical work on corporate governance structure (Sourial, 2004). However, 
corporate governance in Islamic regulation provides a wide guideline that 
encompasses the duties of a Muslim. In addition, Islamic regulations encourage 
corporate governance in each and every individual activity of a Muslim including 
social activities. Furthermore, most studies during recent decades have focused on 
issues related to the comparison between utilized financial instruments and the 
performance  of Islamic and conventional banks (Olson et al., 2008; Srairi, 2009).  
Based on the above evidence and the importance of Islamic finance in the worlds’ 
markets, the principle of corporate governance can be a key topic in Islamic business 
practices. 
Another strand of empirical literature focused on comparing the performance 
of financial institutions such as banks. Competition in the banking industry has been 
intensified over the past decades and is threatening bank returns. The rapid growth of 
Islamic banking and its financial services around the globe in more than 70 countries 
have gained more attention (Choudhury and Hussain, 2005; Hasan and Dridi, 2011). 
There are a large number of studies comparing the differences between Islamic and 
conventional banks (Ahmad, 1989; Iqbal, 2001; Johnes et al., 2013; Metwally, 1997; 
Safiullah, 2010; Samad, 1999, 2004; Siddiqui, 2005). Majority of the discussion was 
related to the differences in financial performance ratios such as liquidity, 
profitability, risk and solvency, capital adequacy and operational efficiency. Some 
studies indicated that Islamic banks are more liquid, less risky and operationally 
more efficient than conventional banks (Al-Muharrami, 2008; Ansari and Rehman, 
2011; Beck et al., 2012; Kadir et al., 2011). In addition, some scholars investigated 
the effect of financial crisis on the banking industry. It is found that Islamic banks 
are more successful during a crisis compared to conventional banks (Abdulle and 
Kassim, 2012; Hasan et al., 2011; Kassim and Majid, 2010; Maiwada, 2013).  
The sources and the consequences of the financial crises are the subject of 
most previous theoretical and empirical research (Asenova, 2011; Foster and 
Magdoff, 2009; Shiller, 2008; Vidal, 2010). The soundness and stability of the 
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financial system was negatively affected by the crisis. During crises, the commercial 
bank suffered a large overhang of non-performing loans. The recession caused much 
business to flounder or fail. In addition, economic downturns and a large number of 
corporate scandals around the word have suffered by weak corporate governance 
practices.  According to Clarke (2000),  Johnson et al. (2000) and Ponnu and 
Ramthandin (2008) failure in corporate governance practice and management 
excessive risk taking caused to the financial crisis. Monitoring excessive risk-taking 
by management is particularly important in the financial sector. Corporate 
governance is responsible for monitoring and oversight of firms’ risk related 
activities. Based on above evidence, the current study investigate the effect of 
corporate governance and risk taking on banks financial performance. 
1.3    Problem Statement 
Attention to corporate governance in developing countries is inadequate 
(Mulili and Wong, 2011). Yet, recent financial crisis along with the rising rate of 
globalization implies that the managing and structure of corporate governance might 
have more impact on performance. Corporate governance in Malaysia was practised 
in march 2000 and  was derived from Hampel report 1998 and Cadbury report 1992 
in UK (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Malaysian business environment is different from 
that of the UK in many aspects. For example, there is high concentration of 
ownership in Malaysia. In addition, due to existence of more autonomous owners 
and shareholders of Malaysian firms, there is no separation among dominant family 
owners and managers. Moreover, the relationship between banks, firms and 
government in Malaysia is close compared to UK firms. Furthermore, Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998) identified that across countries, there are differences in regulatory 
framework, economic environment, strength of markets and governance practices. 
Therefore, the corporate governance structures should be investigated separately.  
The relationship between good corporate governance practices and firm 
performance continues to be a key issue in the financial literature. Gompers et al. 
(2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) suggest measures of governance which take into 
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account different provisions in an index. In both study, the results indicate that there 
is a positive relevance between good governance and performance. However, Bhagat 
and Bolton (2008) criticize a total measurement as a good proxy for overall good 
governance because an index requires that the variables are weighted and an 
appropriate system of weight is yet unresolved in the literature. These authors 
suggest that a single mechanism of corporate governance could be even more 
suitable proxy of good corporate governance than a general index. The board of 
directors, risk management and audit committee has recently received considerable 
attention by academics and legislators. There is a significant body of literature that 
remarks the board characteristics as a fundamental internal mechanism (Bhagat et al., 
2008; Jensen, 1993).  Furthermore, a set of recommendations or norms addresses the 
behaviour and structure of the board through the use of codes and principles of good 
governance (Demise, 2006; Kirkpatrick, 2009a). However, risk management and 
audit committee has special relevance in monitoring and guiding corporate strategy, 
risk policy and overseeing the action of managers.  
The global financial crisis raised the issue in academia about whether the 
mechanisms of corporate governance established in the firms, has adequately solved 
the conflicts of interest between stakeholders, growing the long-term value for the 
company. In this regard, prominent scholars have highlighted corporate governance 
weaknesses in the board practices and monitoring policy, which have encouraged to 
assume excessive corporate risk-taking (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Erkens et al., 2012). 
Based on evidences which discussed earlier, board of director is a fundamental 
internal control system in a firm since this body has final responsibility for the 
functioning of the firm (Bhagat et al., 2008; Wagner III et al., 1998). According to 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and BCBS 
(2006), overseeing the manager actions and monitoring the risk policy and corporate 
strategy applying by board of director and board committees.  This study assumes 
that banks financial performance depends on the quality of monitoring and decision 
making of corporate governance. Therefore, the first issue focuses on the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance across Malaysian banks. 
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In addition, during recent years, bank risk taking and its determinants have 
been widely discussed; whereby studies aimed to explain risk taking behaviour of 
financial regulators, policy makers and researchers (Thomas, 2005). Risk taking is 
defined in the literature as engagement in behaviours associated with some 
probability of undesirable results. It is also referred as the tendency to engage in 
behaviours that are likely to be harmful or dangerous (Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff, 
1997; Furby and Beyth-Marom, 1992; Irwin Jr, 1993). Behaviours of financial 
intermediaries is considered as a key factor in economics and finance since 
controlling the risk taking in banking relates to protection of financial systems and 
depositors as a whole (García-Marco and Robles-Fernández, 2008).  
Number of studies investigated the relationship between corporate 
governance and risk-taking (Akhigbe and Martin, 2008; Fortin et al., 2010; Pathan, 
2009). Pathan (2009) and Fortin et al. (2010) noted that corporate governance of a 
bank with a strong structure might take higher risk. Li (2009) showed a positive 
relationship between risk-taking and corporate governance. Similarly, OECD (2009) 
and Kirkpatrick (2009b), reported that failure of risk management was attributed to 
failure of corporate governance which could leads to poor performance. Srairi (2013) 
indicated that the risk originating from lack of sound corporate governance in Islamic 
banks contributes to financial distress. Corporate governance and risk-taking have 
played important roles in the recent financial crisis, and have shown positive 
relationship with each other (Rose, 2010). According to OECD (2009), the weakness 
and failure of corporate governance and excessive risk-taking were major factors in 
the financial crisis. Other studies pointed out that the arrangements of corporate 
governance regulations to forecast and prevent future crisis were inadequate 
(Cheffins, 2009; Grosse, 2010; Kirkpatrick, 2009b). Moreover, Kirkpatrick (2009b) 
noted that the weakness of corporate governance in protecting against intensive risk-
taking was another factor contributing to the recent financial crisis. However, as with 
most of the East and Southeast Asian economies, the impact of global financial crisis 
on Malaysia were considerable, it is treatable whether excessive risk taking in 
corporate governance of Malaysian banks has an impact on their financial 
performance.Therefore, the second issue focuses on the relationship between 
corporate governance and risk taking across Malaysian banks.  
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However, Laeven et al. (2009) investigated the actual causes for the banking 
sectors’ undertaking risk-taking. They found that the effect of bank regulations on 
risk-taking relates with its corporate governance. Peni and Vähämaa (2012) 
demonstrated that all statements and initiatives of banking supervisory highlight the 
importance of good corporate governance in banking sectors. It might be due to the 
role of corporate governance that can address importance of agency problem and risk 
taking control in financial firms. Therefore, it is essential to assess the potential 
implications of enhanced corporate governance on bank performance.  
In addition, the concept of risk management has widely affected many 
aspects of corporate activities (Taylor‐Gooby and Zinn, 2006). In this regard, some 
scholars investigated the relationship between risk-taking and firm performance 
(Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997). Aaker and Jacobson 
(1987) and Xu and Malkiel (2003) mentioned that risk taking has a positive influence 
on performance. In contrast, Zhang et al. (2013) found a negative relationship 
between them. Risk-taking is one of the most relevant factors that determines firm 
performance in investment related decisions (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). 
Additionally, Cheffins (2009) and Grosse (2010) noted that excessive risk-taking in 
decision making contributed to firms’ failure.  Finally, Lang et al. (2010) showed 
that the principal of agency problem between stakeholders increased the motivation 
for greater profitability in business without considering the risk imposed on the 
firms, failed to be addressed by risk management system of numerous large financial 
institutions. This problem can be removed through a good structure of corporate 
governance. In addition, most scholars have agreed that during recent financial crisis, 
the inability of risk management practices in financial firms contributed to fouled 
corporate governance. Even so, it is treatable whether the corporate governance 
failure is a result of risk management inability. However, research discussion on the 
effect of corporate governance and risk taking during the recent crisis is still limited. 
A combined reading of King and Wen (2011), Nguyen (2011), Fratini and 
Tettamanzi (2015) suggests that corporate risk taking a possible mechanism that 
explains the linkage between corporate governance and financial performance of 
firms. It is this possibility that informs the practice in corporate governance where 
the top management is made part of the ownership structure as a way of gaining their 
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commitment to exercise of prudence in risk taking decisions (Chun et al., 2011; 
Dong et al., 2014; Rahman and Rejab, 2013). Thus, this study uses risk taking as a 
mediator in the relationship between corporate governance and firm financial 
performance. Based on author knowledge, there is no any research that investigated 
the particular role of risk-taking as a mediator in the relationship between corporate 
governance and banks financial performance. Therefore, the third issue, focuses on 
the mediating effect of risk taking on relationship between corporate governance and 
firm financial performance across Malaysian banks.  
The recent financial crisis has shed doubts on the functionality of 
conventional banking leading to raising the attention to Islamic banking (Hasan et 
al., 2011). Researchers and policy makers mentioned that shariah compliant products 
are very attractive for a population that demands financial services that are consistent 
with their religious beliefs. In addition, the importance of shariah compliant financial 
assets has been increasingly amplified. The total asset of Islamic financial institution 
has doubled up to USD 900 billion from 2006 to 2011 (Financial Times, 2011). 
Islamic financial institutions have relatively high market share in emerging markets 
such as Malaysia. However, there is still a little academic evidence regarding the 
function and guidance of Islamic banks. In addition, Islamic banks play an important 
role in the international financial system. Malaysia is one of the successful countries 
known for implementing Islamic banking practices along with the conventional 
banking system. Thus, the competitive condition of banks in this country with their 
different structures and performance makes the study considerable.  
Additionally, existence of dual banking system (Islamic and conventional) in 
countries such as Malaysia makes it interesting to compare the differences of their 
financial performance through the effects of corporate governance and risk taking. 
Srairi (2013) indicated that poor performance of Islamic banks is related to the risk 
originating from lack of sound corporate governance. In this regard, few empirical 
studies investigated this aspect, and compared it with conventional banks (Ali, 2007; 
Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Cihk and Hesse, 2008; Hasan et al., 2011). The theoretical 
and the practical aspects of risk management and corporate governance in Islamic 
banks may not be the same as the conventional banks. Islamic banks employs various 
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practices that do not involve charging or paying interest, which is different than as 
conventional banks. The Islamic financial system promotes the concept of 
participation in a transaction backed by real assets, utilising the funds at risk on a 
profit-and- loss-sharing basis. Several studies have compared financial performance 
of Islamic and conventional banks from different respects around the world (Beck et 
al., 2012; Iqbal, 2001; Kassim et al., 2010; Rosly and Bakar, 2003; Samad, 2004). 
As discussed before, excessive risk taking and corporate governance failure have 
contributed to the recent financial crises, which has affect Malaysian economy as 
well. Moreover, there is high concentration of ownership in Malaysia and due to 
existence of more autonomous owners and shareholders of Malaysian firms, there is 
no separation among dominant family owners and managers. All these reasons taken 
together have given rise to the need to make a comparison between the financial 
performance of Islamic and conventional banking system in Malaysia. Therefore, as 
final issue, it is required to make a comparison between the financial performances 
of Islamic and conventional banks through the effects of board structure, risk-taking. 
1.4    Research Questions 
The specific research questions for this study based on problem statement 
include the following: 
1. Is there any significant relationship between corporate governance and 
banks financial performance? 
2. Is there any significant relationship between corporate governance and 
risk taking? 
3. Does relationship between corporate governance and banks financial 
performance mediated by risk taking? 
4. Is there significance difference between financial performance of Islamic 
and conventional banks?                                                                                                                                                                                                     
11 
 
1.5    Research Objectives  
This study investigates the effect of corporate governance on risk taking and 
banks financial performance. In addition, the role of risk taking is assessed as 
mediator on relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. 
Finally, it compares the differences of financial performance between Islamic and 
conventional banks through the effect of corporate governance and risk taking.  
1. To examine the effect of corporate governance on financial performance 
2. To examine the effect of corporate governance on risk taking. 
3. To show the role of risk taking as mediator on the relationship between 
corporate governance and banks financial performance. 
4. To show the differences of financial performance of Islamic and conventional 
banks in Malaysia.                                                                                                                                                                                            
1.6    Significance of Study 
Generally, the significant contributions of this study are twofold, namely, 
theoretical development, and policy implication. In relation to theory development, 
this study fills the gap in the literature series by capturing the impact of risk taking 
on financial performance of banks in Malaysia. In relation to this point, number of 
studies such as; Ferrero-Ferrero et al. (2012), Munisi and Randøy (2013), Kryvko 
(2012), Hu and Izumida (2008), Haniffa et al. (2006) and Li et al. (2015) 
investigated the effect of corporate governance on firm performance. They did not 
address the effect of risk taking on the relationship between corporate governance 
and performance. In addition, reviewing the past literature on assessing the 
performance difference between Islamic and conventional banks has shown that 
there is not any evidence of comparing the financial performance of Islamic and 
conventional banks through the effect of corporate governance and risk taking. This 
is the first extensive study to the best of the author’s knowledge that considers the 
performance differences of indicated banks through the effect of corporate 
governance and risk taking as mediator variable. However, comparing the financial 
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performance differences between Islamic and conventional banks will help to gain a 
more comprehensive view about how two banking systems faced the crisis. Since the 
present study investigates the corporate governance of two systems with regard to  
risk taking and their impact on financial performance, it takes an important step to 
complete the literature in the field of comparative study of the Islamic and 
conventional banking by identifying and analysing the causes of crisis particularly in 
Malaysia. 
In relation to policy implication, this study highlights the importance of 
effective future public policy to understand which aspects of corporate governance 
have the greatest impact on financial performance after considering risk taking. The 
recent financial crisis and increasingly competitive environment in the banking 
industry have made the bank to pay more attention to the corporate governance and 
its effect on financial performance. This study contributes to the continuing debate 
on corporate governance and risk taking by providing a timely and comprehensive 
investigation of financial performance of Malaysian banks. This study highlights the 
role that corporate governance (board structure, risk management and audit 
committee) at financial institutions may have played in the risk-taking behaviour that 
likely effected performance.  
This study provides useful guidelines for the corporate sectors, financial 
institutions, shareholders, depositors, and investors. The guidelines could assist firms 
to react effectively and efficiently during different economic conditions. Moreover, 
this study provides a good guideline for managers to consider an appropriate set of 
corporate governance model related to specific systems of banks (Islamic and 
conventional) in their decision making. It is highly important to explore the role of 
variables that may influence the financial performance of banks.  
1.7    Scope of Research 
Performance measurement is the most important concept in the financial 
management. The current study has investigated the relationship between corporate 
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governance (board size, board independence, independent risk management 
committee, risk management committee size, audit committee size, independent 
audit committee and ownership concentration) and banks financial performance 
(ROA and ROE). The purpose of this research is explaining the variables, which can 
affect financial performance of banks. In this regard, the effects of variables, like risk 
taking (credit risk, leverage risk) as a mediator variable and number of control 
variables such as (loan to asset, equity to asset, customer loan to customer asset, 
liquidity, banks type and bank size) have investigated. Nonetheless of investigating 
the linkage of these variables, the role of risk taking recognized on relationship 
between corporate governance and banks financial performance. Furthermore, the 
differences of financial performance between Islamic and conventional banks are 
demonstrated. 
Due to the fact that a certain period of time is considered in financial and 
economic studies in order to avoid the effect of various factors in the course of time, 
this study employed a ten year panel data from 2005 to 2014. This study utilizes 
panel data techniques due to the nature of data which is considered as the 
combination of cross-section oriented and time series based data, and is also based 
on the number of banks certified by Bank Negara in Malaysia (conventional and 
Islamic banks). Malaysia is among the successful emerging countries in the word in 
well practicing of Islamic banking besids the conventional pair. As a result, the total 
assets in Islamic banking system rose from RM 1.2 billion in 1991 to RM 157.1 
billion in 2007 and reached to RM 494.6 in 2014 in Malaysia (Chong and Liu, 2009; 
Sufian, 2010). The market share of Malaysians Islamic banking system comprises 
14% of the total deposits and financing of the banking sector in this country (Sufian, 
2010), however, this share is predicted to rise to 20 present in 2020. Furthermore, 
this study lets the financial performance of Islamic banks to be compared with 
conventional ones. According to Chong et al. (2009), at the end of 2004, Malaysians 
banking system offers a full range of  Islamic banking products and services. Based 
on this reasoning, the current study applied data collection from 2005. Twenty one 
conventional  and sixteen Islamic Malaysian banks have been taken into account in 
this research which is consistent with  Rahman et al., (2013). 
14 
 
1.8    Definition of Important Terms 
 Return on Equity (ROE) - Return on Equity (ROE) calculated by dividing a 
bank’s total net income to total shareholder equity. 
 Return on Asset (ROA) - Return on asset (ROA) calculated by dividing a 
bank’s total net income earning by its total asset. ROA is one of the important 
variables to measure operating performance (Barber and Lyon, 1996). 
 Corporate Governance - Cadbury (1992) defined corporate governance as 
the system by which companies are directed and controlled.  According to 
(OECD 2004), corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
 Board Independence - Shows by percentage of independence non-executive 
directors in the board (BIND). 
 Board Size - Measured by number of directors in a board (BSIZE).  
 Risk management committee size-  Measured by number of directors in a 
Risk management committee (RMCSIZE). 
 Independent risk management committee - Shows by percentage of 
independence non-executive directors in the risk management committee 
(INRMC). 
 Audit committee size - Measured by number of directors in Audit committee 
(ACSIZE). 
 Independent audit committee- Shows by percentage of independence non-
executive directors in the audit committee (INAC). 
 Ownership Concentration – Equity percentage participation by the largest 
shareholder of Malaysian bank (OC).  
 Risk Taking – An activity or action in someone or directors takes risks to 
achieve a benefit. 
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1.9    Research Outline 
This study is organized as follows: This chapter (chapter 1) introduces the 
thesis and describes the research background, problem statement, objectives, 
research questions, scope, and potential contribution to knowledge and definition of 
terms. 
 Chapter 2 provides an extensive literature review, compares, analysis, 
discusses, and summarizes the studies which have been carried out previously. It also 
studied on corporate governance definitions and related theories, corporate 
governance principles, Basel committee, corporate governance in Malaysia, 
corporate governance at banks and financial determinants of banks performance. 
Moreover, it has developed conceptual frame work and hypotheses. The literature 
review also provides insights in to the relationships between corporate governance 
characteristics, risk taking and financial performance. However, this chapter 
discusses the performance differences between Islamic and conventional banks.  
Chapter 3 discusses the methodologies employed in this study. This study 
utilizes the econometric techniques related to panel data analysis, that is, static 
models (pooled OLS and, GMM, and fixed effect analysis) using unbalanced panel 
data. In addition, Sobel test and Baron and Keny approach has been used to test 
mediator effect. However, for identify the financial performance differences between 
two banks the study applied to independent T-test. 
As for the chapter 4, it reports on the empirical findings of the model tested. 
The chapter present the results of OLS, fixed effect, GMM, Sobel test, approach of 
Baron and Keny, and independent t-test for analysing statistical models in banking 
industry. This chapter aims to identify the effect of corporate governance on financial 
performance of Malaysian banks by mediating risk taking. 
Finally, the chapter 5 discusses the statistical results, whereby it outlines the 
contributions that this research makes to the study of corporate governance, and risk 
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taking on financial performance of Malaysian banks. Thereafter, it discusses some 
limitations to the research and makes some suggestion for future study. 
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